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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Jerry Lee Olin appeals from his felony convictions entered upon his valid guilty 
pleas to three counts of sexual abuse of a minor. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Between August 2001 and September 2002, Olin, a man in his 30s, sexually 
molested and abused his three step-daughters, C.A.C., age 9, C.M.C., age 7, and 
C.N.C., age 6. (PSE, p.4.) Olin made each girl lay in bed with him, naked, where he 
would fondle their breasts, buttocks, and vaginal areas. (PSI, p.2.) He made the girls 
take baths with him, and sexually molested C.N.C. while bathing. (Incident Report, p.10 
(appended to PSI).) Often, Olin would remove C.A.C. from school early, take her out to 
pizza, and then back home to molest her. (Incident Report, pp.12-13 (appended to 
PSI).) He forced C.A.C. to obtain a bottle of lubricant from a drawer, which he used to 
masturbate in front of her. (Incident Report, p.13 (appended to PSI).) He also forced 
her to watch pornographic films with him. (Id.) And, on at least one occasion, Olin 
raped her. (Id.) 
Olin was indicted by a grand jury on eight separate felony counts. (R., pp.8-11.) 
Three of the felony counts were for Lewd Conduct with a Minor under Sixteen for Olin's 
genital to genital contact against C.A.C. when she was nine, manual to genital contact 
against C.M.C. when she was seven or eight, and manual to genital contact against 
C.N.C. when she was only six. (Id.) The remaining five counts were for Sexual Abuse 
of a Child under the Age of Sixteen Years, for fondling the girls' breasts and buttocks, 
viewing pornographic movies with them, and masturbating in front of them. (Id.) 
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Faced with these charges and their attendant jeopardy, Olin negotiated a plea 
agreement with prosecutors pursuant to which he pled guilty to an amended indictment 
charging three counts of sexual abuse of a minor, in exchange for the State dismissing 
the rest of the charges. (R., p.86; Tr., p.5, L.5 - p.6, L.14.) Pursuant to this agreement, 
the State amended the indictment (R., pp.80-81), and Olin pled guilty (Tr., p.13, L.16 -
p.14, LA). The remaining counts were dismissed. (R., p.84.) 
The district court entered judgment of conviction and sentenced Olin to three 
concurrent unified sentences of 20 years each with ten years fixed. (R., pp.165-67.) 
Olin filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.171-72.) 
While that appeal was pending, the State moved the district court pursuant to 
Idaho Criminal Rule 35 for correction of an i"egal sentence. (Motion for Correction of 
Sentence under I.C.R. 35 (Augmentation 1).) The State's motion was granted, and 
Olin's three sentences were reduced to concurrent unified sentences of 15 years with 
ten years fixed.2 (Amended Judgment (Augmentation).) 
1 A Motion to Augment the Record with the State's "Motion for Correction of Sentence 
under I.C.R. 35" was filed contemporaneously with this Respondent's Brief. 
2 The State took this corrective action in response to a sentencing argument raised in 
Olin's original opening brief. After the district court granted the State's motion and 
corrected the i"egal sentence, Olin filed a revised opening brief removing the 
sentencing issue. Citations to the Appe"ant's brief herein are to Olin's revised brief. 
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ISSUE 
Olin states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court lack jurisdiction over the subject matter of the 
charge of sexual abuse of a minor because the law and facts alleged in 
Count I of the Indictment failed to allege a valid charge under the version 
of the statute that applies to Mr. Olin's case? 
(Appellant's brief, p.3.) 
The State rephrases the issue as: 
Does Olin's knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea to charges pursuant to 
a negotiated plea agreement waive the ex post facto defense Olin is trying to raise for 
the first time on appeal? 
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ARGUMENT 
Olin's Knowing, Intelligent, And Voluntary Guilty Plea Operates As A Waiver Of Any 
Constitutional Defense Based On The Prohibition Against Ex Post Facto Laws 
A. Introduction 
Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement under which the State dismissed 
several other charges, Olin pled guilty and was convicted on three counts of sexual 
abuse of a minor. (See Tr., p.13, L.16 - p.14, LA; R, pp.165-67.) Olin argues for the 
first time on appeal that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the 
charge in Count I of the Amended Indictment, and therefore could not convict Olin of 
that particular sexual abuse charge. (Appellant's brief, ppA-7.) Specifically, Olin 
asserts that the conduct charged, masturbating in a child's presence, was not a crime 
under the statute as it existed circa 2001-2002. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-7.) Improper 
retroactive application of laws, however, is an ex post facto defense, not a jurisdictional 
one. Because Olin's knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea waived this 
constitutional defense, he may not assert it for the first time on appeal. His conviction 
should therefore be affirmed. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether a court lacks jurisdiction is a question of law over which courts exercise 
free review. State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757, 101 P.3d 699, 701 (2004). Similarly, 
constitutional issues are questions of law over which appellate courts exercise free 
review. State v. Casey, 125 Idaho 856, 857 n.2, 876 P.2d 138, 139 n.2 (1994). 
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C. Olin's Valid Guilty Plea Waived His Constitutional Defense Against Conviction In 
Contravention Of The Prohibition Against Ex Post Facto Laws 
It is long settled that a valid guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional defects and 
defenses, whether constitutional or statutory. State v. Kelchner, 130 Idaho 37, 39, 936 
P.2d 680,682 (1997); State v. Book, 127 Idaho 352,354,900 P.2d 1363, 1365 (1995). 
Olin knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily pled guilty to all three Counts of the 
Amended Indictment, including Count I. (See Tr., p.13, L.16 - p.18, L.17.) Count I of 
the Amended Indictment charged: 
That the Defendant, JERRY LEE OLIN, over the age of eighteen, to-wit: 
30 years of age or older, on or between November, 2001 and September, 
2002, in the County of Kootenai, State of Idaho, did induce, cause or 
permit a minor child, C.A.C., of the age of 9 years to witness an act of 
sexual conduct, to wit: by masturbating in the presence of said child. 
(R., pp.80-81.) 
Olin was charged, entered his guilty pleas, and was convicted in 2010. At that 
time, Idaho Code § 18-1506, Sexual Abuse of a Child under the Age of Sixteen Years, 
read: 
(1) It is a felony for any person eighteen (18) years of age or older, with 
the intent to gratify the lust, passions, or sexual desire of the actor, minor 
child or third party, to: 
(a) Solicit a minor child under the age of sixteen (16) years to 
participate in a sexual act; 
(b) Cause or have sexual contact with such minor child, not 
amounting to lewd conduct as defined in section 18-1508, Idaho 
Code; 
(c) Make any photographic or electronic recording of such minor 
child; or 
(d) Induce, cause or permit a minor child to witness an act of sexual 
conduct. 
(2) For the purpose of this section "solicit" means any written, verbal, or 
physical act which is intended to communicate to such minor child the 
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desire of the actor or third party to participate in a sexual act or participate 
in sexual foreplay, by the means of sexual contact, photographing or 
observing such minor child engaged in sexual contact. 
(3) For the purposes of this section "sexual contact" means any physical 
contact between such minor child and any person, which is caused by the 
actor, or the actor causing such minor child to have self contact. 
(4) For the purposes of this section "sexual conduct" means human 
masturbation, sexual intercourse, sadomasochistic abuse, or any touching 
of the genitals or pubic areas of the human male or female, or the breasts 
of the female, whether alone or between members of the same or 
opposite sex or between humans and animals in an act of apparent sexual 
stimulation or gratification. 
(5) Any person guilty of a violation of the provisions of this section shall 
be imprisoned in the state prison for a period not to exceed twenty-five 
(25) years. 
I.C. § 18-1506 (2008). The Amended Indictment, however, alleged that Olin had 
committed the criminal conduct between 2001 and 2002. (R., pp.80-81.) At that time, 
the applicable code section read: 
(1) It is a felony for any person eighteen (18) years of age or older, with 
the intent to gratify the lust, passions, or sexual desire of the actor, minor 
child or third party, to: 
(a) solicit a minor child under the age of sixteen (16) years to 
participate in a sexual act, or 
(b) cause or have sexual contact with such minor child, not 
amounting to lewd cond uct as defined in section 18-1508, Idaho 
Code, or 
(c) make any photographic or electronic recording of such minor 
child. 
(2) For the purpose of this section "solicit" means any written, verbal, or 
physical act which is intended to communicate to such minor child the 
desire of the actor or third party to participate in a sexual act or participate 
in sexual foreplay, by the means of sexual contact, photographing or 
observing such minor child engaged in sexual contact. 
(3) For the purposes of this section "sexual contact" means any physical 
contact between such minor child and any person, which is caused by the 
actor, or the actor causing such minor child to have self contact. 
6 
(4) Any person guilty of a violation of the provisions of this section shall be 
imprisoned in the state prison for a period not to exceed fifteen (15) years. 
I.C. § 18-1506 (1992). 
Thus, as correctly noted by Olin on appeal, the conduct alleged in Count I of the 
Amended Indictment (masturbating in the presence of a child) was not criminalized until 
several years after he committed it. (Appellant's brief, p.7.) Olin's underlying complaint, 
therefore, is that prosecuting and convicting him under Idaho Code § 18-1506 as it 
existed in 2010 for conduct that was perpetrated during 2001 and 2002 violates the 
constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. 
The prohibition against ex post facto laws is found in Article I Section 10 of the 
United States Constitution, which reads, UNo state shall ... pass any ... ex post facto 
law." U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 10. As explained by the United States Supreme Court, an 
ex post facto law is: 
1 st. Every law that makes an action, done before the passing of the law, 
and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 
2nd. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, 
when committed. 3rd. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts 
a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when 
committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and 
receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of 
the commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender. 
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798). And as the Idaho Court of Appeals has 
explained, U[p]rosecution under the later version of [I.C. § 18-1506] would run afoul of 
the prohibition against ex post facto laws." State v. Hernandez, 122 Idaho 227, 229, 
832 P.2d 1162,1164 (Ct. App. 1992). Olin's claim, which he asserts for the first time on 
appeal, falls squarely within the definition of an ex post facto law. 
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The United States Supreme Court, however, has held that this prohibition against 
ex post facto laws applies only as a bar to legislation; it does not reach action, even 
erroneous action, by the courts. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 343-44 (1915) ("the 
constitutional prohibition: 'No state shall ... pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, 
or law impairing the obligation of contracts,' as its terms indicate, is directed against 
legislative action only, and does not reach erroneous or inconsistent action by the 
courts" (ellipses original)); see also Ross v. Oregon, 227 U.S. 150, 160-61 (1913). 
Therefore, though Olin had a viable defense based on a constitutional defect, ex post 
facto application of the law does not present a jurisdictional defect. 
The Idaho Supreme Court recently held in State v. Manzanares, Docket No. 
35703,2012 Opinion No.9 (January 6,2012) (hereinafter "Slip Op."), that ex post facto 
defenses may be waived by knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty pleas. In that 
case, Manzanares was charged with violating the recruiting provision of the Idaho 
Criminal Gang Enforcement Act. !s:L at 2. Manzanares claimed that her conviction 
violated the ex post facto clause because, though the Information charged both conduct 
which occurred before and after the adoption of the Act, the basis for the Information 
was alleged conduct that predated the Act's adoption. !s:L at 9. Having failed to raise 
the ex post facto issue in front of the district court, Manzanares claimed that it was 
jurisdictional and therefore proper on appeal. !s:L at 10. The Idaho Supreme Court held 
that "Manzanares's ex post facto issue is not jurisdictional and was, therefore, waived 
by pleading guilty." !s:L The Supreme Court went on to address whether Manzanares' 
claim involved fundamental error, and further clarified that "she waived the ex post facto 
issue by knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entering into the plea agreement." !s:L 
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The Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Manzanares is consistent with other 
courts that have considered the question and ruled that violations of the constitutional 
prohibition against ex post facto legislation are subject to the same knowing, intelligent, 
and voluntary waiver as other constitutional defenses when entering a valid guilty plea. 
See, ~, Rose v. Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1113-14 (9th Cir. 2005) (affirmative 
acceptance of plea agreement waives ex post facto challenges, even where the 
defendant might not specifically understand he was waiving that particular right); Twillie 
v. Mississippi, 892 So.2d 187, 190 (Miss. 2004) ("a defendant '" can waive his ex post 
facto rights"); Bell v. Mississippi, 726 SO.2d 93, 94 (Miss. 1998) ("A defendant may 
knowingly and voluntarily waive an ex post facto claim in plea negotiations."); Allen v. 
Oklahoma, 821 P.2d 371, 376 (Ok!. Cr. 1991) ("The waiver of [the constitutional right 
preventing the application of an ex post facto law] is just as valid as the waiver of any of 
the other constitutional protections given up in connection with a plea of guilty."). 
And Olin was aware that he was generally waiving constitutional rights and 
defenses. As the district court explained at Olin's change of plea hearing: 
THE COURT: If you have any rights or privileges otherwise that you think 
you want to assert in this case, you give those up, including right to - if 
you thought there was something wrong with the way the proceedings 
were handled one way or the other. Basically, as a practical matter, once 
you have entered the guilty plea here, you have given up your other 
issues, claims, defenses, rights, or privileges, and the only thing left in this 
case is sentencing. Do you understand that's where you end up? 
THE DEFENDANT: I understand, your Honor. 
(Tr., p.12, L.25 - p.13, L.15.) Understanding that he was waiving all constitutional 
defenses, Olin went forward and voluntarily and freely entered his valid guilty plea. (Tr., 
p.13, L.16 - p.18, L.17.) 
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Unquestionably, a conviction in contravention of the constitutional prohibition 
against ex post facto laws represents a constitutional defect. Had Olin asserted that 
constitutional defense, he likely could have obtained dismissal of Count" of the original 
Indictment, the same charge he now challenges on appeal. But Olin did not assert that 
defense; instead, Olin pled guilty pursuant to the negotiated plea agreement. (Tr., p.13, 
L.16 - p.14, LA; p.16, L.10 - p.17, L.13.) The district court found that this plea was 
"voluntarily entered and freely and voluntarily made," and so valid. (Tr., p.18, Ls.15-17.) 
As explained above, entry of a valid guilty plea waives all constitutional defects and 
defenses. See Kelchner, 130 Idaho at 39, 936 P.2d at 682. This waiver includes any 
ex post facto issues. Manzanares, Slip Op. at 10. Therefore, the constitutional defense 
that Count " of the original Indictment, which became Count I of the Amended 
Indictment, represented an improper ex post facto application of the law was waived 
upon entry of Olin's valid guilty plea. 
The justice of this rule is made especially clear in this case, where Olin 
negotiated for the specific charges to which he ultimately pled guilty. (Tr., p.5, L.9 - p.6, 
L.14; R, p.86.) Olin also benefited greatly from the plea agreement: Originally, the 
grand jury indicted Olin with eight separate charges, three felony counts for lewd and 
lascivious conduct and five felony counts for sexual abuse of a minor, perpetrated on 
three separate victims. (R, pp.8-11.) For the three counts of lewd and lascivious 
conduct alone, Olin faced the possible jeopardy of three life sentences. I.C. § 18-1508. 
Reviewing the plea agreement, it seems apparent that the parties' goal was to 
remove from Olin the potential jeopardy of three life sentences in exchange for three 
guilty pleas on three counts of sexual abuse, one for each of the victims. (See R, pp.8-
10 
11, compare with pp.80-81, 86.) Under the agreement, the Indictment was amended to 
charge Olin with merely three counts of sexual abuse of a minor, each of which carried 
a maximum jeopardy of 15 years.3 (R., pp.80-81; I.C. § 18-1506(4) (1992).) The victim 
whose sexual abuse charge creates the ex post facto concerns was originally the 
subject of four separate charges. (R., pp.8-11.) Had either party expressed any 
concern with the apparent ex post facto issues, the State could have amended the 
charge or sought a guilty plea on a different count. 
Because Olin waived any constitutional defects or defenses with his knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea, whether Count I of the Amended Indictment 
represents an improper ex post facto application of law is not properly before this Court. 
Olin's attempt to avoid his waiver by arguing that the district court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction to enter conviction upon his valid guilty plea fails, and his conviction should 
be affirmed. 
3 The parties, apparently unaware of any potential ex post facto issues in the charges, 
believed that the maximum sentence on each count was 25 years. (See R., p.86; Tr., 
p.6, L.15 - p.7, L.11.) Upon having this error brought to the State's attention by Olin's 
original opening brief, the State took immediate corrective action, filing a motion to 
correct illegal sentence pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35. (Motion for Correction of 
Sentence under I.C.R. 35 (Augmentation).) This motion could have been brought by 
either party at any time during these proceedings. I.C.R. 35(a); Hernandez, 122 Idaho 
at 229,832 P.2d at 1164. 
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CONCLUSION 
The State respectfully requests that this Court affirm Olin's felony convictions for 
Sexual Abuse of a Child and his sentences as modified by the district court. 
DATED this 25th day of January, 2012. 
~~ RLiSPENCER 
Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 25th day of January 2012, served a true and 
correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy addressed 
to: 
DIANE M. WALKER 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
Deputy Attorney General 
RJS/pm 
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